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I. INTRODUCTION
In a recent issue of Howard Law School's The Jurist, Richard
Delgado suggested that a Nobel Prize should be awarded to the legal
scholar or social scientist that discovers how "racial relations" in
America consistently replicate to produce racial inequality like the
genetic code that enables organisms to replicate.' Certainly Professors
Kevin Brown, Leland Ware, and John Valery White are contenders for
such a prize.2 The panel presentations and articles by Professors
Brown, Ware, and White support the outcome of Grutter v Boflingei
as consistent with the racial justice agenda set fifty years ago for the
judiciary in Brown v Board of Education.4 Yet all three raise several
* Professor of Law, Tulane University School of Law School. Professor Scott
served as the panel moderator.
1. Remarks by Richard Delgado and Jean Stephanic, THE JURIST, Fall 2003, at 26,
27 [hereinafter Remarks]. For example, the indignities of Jim Crow replicated many of the
deprivations of slavery. Brown v Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), represented a break in
the chain and what many thought was the final achievement of equal protection under the law
for African-Americans. Today, however, racially segregated public schools are replicas of the
public school systems that predated Brown.
2. See Kevin Brown, The Racial Gap in Ability From the Fifieenth Century to
Grutter and Gratz, 78 TuL. L. REv. 2061 (2004); Leland Ware, Stn'ct Scruthiy, Affirmative
Action, and Academic Freedom: The University of Michigan Cases, 78 TUL. L. REv. 2097
(2004); John Valery White, hat IsAffirmative Action?, 78 TuL. L. REV. 2117 (2004).
3. 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
4. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Curt A. Levey also participated on this panel. His remarks
were based on his editorial, Colleges Should Take No Comfort in the Supreme Courtl
Reprieve, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, B 11 (July 18, 2003). Levey reads the Court's
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intriguing questions about affirmative action and critiques of the
Court's decisionmaking methodology.
A. The Occasion
The following language in the majority opinion in Grutter,
authored by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, inspired the title of the
panel Twenty Five Yea: The Future ofAffimaveActioIz
It has been 25 years since Justice Powell first approved the use of race
to further an interest in student body diversity in the context of public
higher education. Since that time, the number of minority applicants
with high grades and test scores has indeed increased. We expect that
25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be
necessary to further the interest approved today.5
So one issue considered by Professors Brown, Ware, and White is
whether the effects of slavery and subsequent policies of racial
injustice, in practice in America for at least sixteen generations (400
years), can be removed in one generation (twenty-five years), or even
two generations,' as a barrier to entry into higher education.
Each author provides a relevant social history of affirmative
action as a remedy for past discrimination and a litigation review from
Plessy v Ferguson7 to Brown, from Brown to Regents of the University
of California v Bakke,8 from Bakke to Adamnd v Pena,9 and from
Adarandto Grutter Their work reaffirms that history is important in
assessing the relevance of a generation, or twenty-five years, as a
benchmark for reevaluating the need for affirmative action.
The authors take us back to 1619, when the first twenty Africans
arrived in the colony of Virginia. Captured from a Spanish slave ship
reference to "25 years" as a "limited reprieve" on considering race as a diversity factor and
upon the holding that diversity is a compelling government interest. He reads Justice
O'Connor's language as a positive mandate to the government to work towards ending the
consideration of race in admissions over the next twenty-five years. "The bottom line is that
any higher education institution still using race-based admissions 25 years from now will be
doing so without the Supreme Court's sanction." Id. Levey proposes that Congress enact a
mandatory timetable for phasing out race-based admissions, "in order to put more teeth into
the Court's 25-year limit and sunset-provision requirement." Id. He calls for colleges and
universities to pursue race-neutral alternatives to achieve diversity, and to broaden the
definition of diversity. Levey predicts further litigation by affirmative action opponents and
continued public and political opposition to race-based college admission.
5. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2347.
6. Brown was decided one generation prior to Bakke and two generations prior to
Grutter.
7. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
8. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
9. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
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by the English they were not at first slaves. But within less than fifty
years, many colonial legislatures had enshrined slavery into their
laws.'" The Constitution insulated the institution of slavery from
significant government interference. In 1863, President Lincoln issued
the Emancipation Proclamation. So for ten generations, the conscious
consideration of race determined one's status as slave or free person.
Between 1863 and 1954, America experienced a civil war, three
constitutional amendments to end slavery and confer citizenship on
former slaves, a short-lived "reconstruction" of the South and the lives
of former slaves, World War I, World War II, and United States
Supreme Court-sanctioned segregation based on race." So for four
more generations, the conscious consideration of race continued to
determine socioeconomic, political, and even military status: separate
but equal.
From 1954 to 2004, we experienced the civil rights movement
and affirmative action. During that period we have seen challenges to
affirmative action, yet today we still celebrate Brown fifty years later.
So for only two of the sixteen generations of black people's presence in
America as both slave and citizen, did race become relevant for
providing a remedy for past discrimination and for consideration as
one of many factors that constitute "diversity."
Not only are time and history relevant in assessing affirmative
action, but each prize contender also takes a holistic approach to
understanding the replication process under study.
B The Response. Replicating Racial Injustice
Professor Kevin Brown shows that Grutter did not end the war
against racial injustice. Specifically, he focuses on the racial gap in
standardized test scores and whether any thing can be done to close it
and improve education at the K-12 grade levels over the next twenty-
five years. Professor Brown claims that the racial gap in standardized
test scores replicates racial injustice by perpetuating the stereotypes of
racial inferiority that supported slavery and segregation. He states:
"The existence of the academic racial gaps may simply be the latest
chapter in the sad, sordid, and prolonged history of presumably
objective, neutral, and non-biased justifications for racism that have
plagued Western societies....,3
10. See Brown, supm note 2, at 2074-75.
11. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551-52.
12. See Brown, supm note 2, at 2092-95.
13. Id. at 2072.
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Professor Brown reviews the history of social science- and
natural science-based explanations for racial difference that bolstered
the institutional barriers against racial integration.'4 He demonstrates
that even cases like Brown and Grutter are based on the belief that
black people are inferior to white people and need to assimilate into
white culture in order to improve." The gap in test scores is therefore a
product of the psychological harm done to whites and blacks by the
racial hierarchy message.16 Professor Brown concludes that experts
cannot develop "culturally neutral" standardized tests "because of the
existence of the history of racial and ethnic oppression in our
country."'7
Professor Leland Ware characterizes Grutteras a testament to the
civil rights movement style of organizing a litigation campaign.'8
Professor Ware sees the twenty-five-year language as settling the
legitimacy of affirmative action in higher education.'" However, he is
also of the opinion that Grutter did not directly address racial
inequality because it gave a broad amorphous definition to
"diversity." 20
He also highlights how the Court applied strict scrutiny
deferentially in the academic setting in light of academic freedom
principles.2' Professor Ware disagrees with those who have argued that
Justice O'Connor's formulation of the strict scrutiny standard makes
Grutter inconsistent with Croson or Adarand He places Grutterin the
evolution of heightened scrutiny from United States v Carolene
Products.2 1 Professor Ware contends that what he calls the "academic
deference principle" is analogous to the "arbitrary and capricious"
standard of judicial review.3  He concludes that because the strict
scrutiny standard applied by the majority in Grutter was much more
"relaxed and flexible" than in the past, "[t]his is a significant
14. Id. at 2084-89.
15. Id at 2090-91. I address this underlying fallacy in affirmative actionjurisprudence in Wendy Brown-Scott, Unpacing the AffIrmativeAction Rhetoric, 30 WAKE
FOREST L. REv. 801, 806 (1995). "This persistent belief that African Americans are inferior,
not affirmative action, perpetuates the stereotype of the unworthy black recipient of
preferential treatment." Id. at 806-07.
16. Brown, supra note 2, at 2095.
17. Id.
18. Ware, supm note 2, at 2098.
19. Id. at 2112.
20. Id. at 2114.
21. Id. at 2108-12.
22. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
23. Ware, supm note 2, at 2110.
2056 [Vol. 78:2053
2004] THE FUTURE OF AFFIRMA TIVE A CTION
development in the Court's Equal Protection jurisprudence," that will
make future challenges to affirmative action predicted by Justice
Scalia difficult.
24
Professor John Valery White sees the level of scrutiny as relevant
for different reasons. Professor White asks the fundamental question:
"What is affirmative action?" He posits the need for a definition in
order to know how to judge challenges to affirmative action as
constitutionally distinct from cases involving individual or class
discrimination claims. Professor White traces the equating of
affirmative action with facially invidious discrimination to Bakke,
which in turn rests on language in Korematsu v United Stated' and
Hirabayashi v United States.2  Professor White sees several
consequences flowing from this equation: the rejection of the
benign/invidious distinction, the level of scrutiny chosen as a reflection
of the Court's view of affirmative action, and the innocent victim
factor.
Professor White challenges the unexamined assumption in the
Court's jurisprudence that affirmative action constitutes discrimination
akin to the facial racial discrimination challenged in cases such as
Loving v Viginid and Gomillion v Lightfoot"0 He rejects the theory
flowing from Bakke that the act of racial classification itself is
discriminatory.3' He looks at the academic, political, moral, and
judicial meanings of affirmative action to challenge Justice Powell's
characterization of racial classification as discrimination." Instead,
Professor White argues that affirmative action is consistent with the
equality principle.
Professor White defines affirmative action as "disputes over
discrimination in contexts where discrimination itself is difficult to
prove" because of the difficulty in showing causation and damage."
The paradox created by the proof problem is that plaintiffs in
discrimination cases must meet a relatively stringent proof standard,
while opponents of affirmative action plans need only show a
24. Id. at 2099.
25. White, supm note 2, at 2183- 84 .
26. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
27. 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
28. White, supm note 2, at 2129-30.
29. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
30. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
31. White, supra note 2, at 2162-68.
32. Idat 2127-80.
33. Id. at 2127.
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classification exists based on race to create a presumption of
discrimination.34 This definition distinguishes affirmative action from
antidiscrimination law and the policy-focused concepts of affirmative
action."
However, Professor White sees Grutteras a case positing that the
affirmative action practiced by the law school was not intentional
discrimination, but holding on to the assumption that affirmative
action is discrimination. In fact, an affirmative action plan is
presumed discriminatory unless the government can offer a
compelling reason why it is not. Professor White suggests that instead
of the presumption, courts should require proof of discrimination
caused "because of not in spite of"36 affirmative action as a way of
distinguishing the evidentiary standard from that in facial
discrimination case law. He concludes that unless the Court defines
affirmative action as he proposes, affirmative action to promote
diversity will continue to lose support because it is viewed as
analogous to intentional discrimination.
Professor White's point is that to view affirmative action as
discrimination analogous to Jim Crow-era practices is legally wrong
and morally indefensible. His Article is also part of the larger debate
pitting individual, negative equality against positive, group-based
equality. Most positive rights countries (for example, the European
Union, Canada, and India) view positive or affirmative action as a
group remedy for past discrimination, not itself a form of
discrimination, and evaluate its application under a proportionality
standard closer to rational basis than heightened scrutiny. Perhaps the
deferential strict scrutiny standard employed by the Grutter majority
has moved the Court away from the facial discrimination model and
closer to the proportionality standard."
II. CONCLUSION
The psychological and social effects of "racial relations" are
deeply embedded in the individual psyche of all Americans. 8 African-
34. Id. at 2178.
35. Id. at 2179.
36. Personnel Administrators v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
37. See Ware, supm note 2, at 2110-11.
38. For an exploration of the social and psychological effects of racial relations, see
Vincene Verdun, If the Shoe Fits, Wear It: An Analysis of Reparations to Black Ameicans,
67 TuL. L. REv. 597, 633-634 (1995) (discussing spiritual injuries such as the presumption ofinferiority and the devaluation of self esteem); Wendy Brown Scott, Transformative
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Americans even remain largely invisible to many white Americans, as
so eloquently explored by the late Ralph Ellison in The Invisible
Man." Courts and lawmakers confront a society that remains
massively shaped by the consequences of the racial construction of
white superiority/black inferiority.4 ° Grutter represents yet another
chapter in the continuing story of dismantling this construct.
Professors Kevin Brown, Leland Ware, and John Valery White would
agree that the story cannot end until black Americans have achieved
full acceptance by white Americans as equal.
I can personally attest to the reality of the inferior/superior race
relations construct. My life has been a series of decisions to persevere,
despite the belief of some that I was not qualified, or deserving. Of
course I know I am. But for the God I serve, the family He placed me
in, and my desire to learn and know the history of my people in
America and Africa, my life might have been no different than the
many African-American men, women, and children who cannot read,
write, or hold a decent job in the richest nation on earth. What is most
frightening is that many young black children have no desire to go
beyond their circumstances. On the other hand, white Americans
seemingly have no desire to have their minds desegregated.
In an essay entitled The Miseducaton of White America 4 I
suggest that one reason some white Americans hold a distorted view of
black people and our ability is that they know very little about us. As
Professor Bryan Fair stated during comments at the Symposium, "it is
as if our story-the African American story-never happened."
However, the miseducation of white America is rarely acknowledged
as a consequence of a perpetual racial hierarchy. Professor Brown
effectively resurrects Justice Douglas's dissent in Defunis v Odegaard2
to make this point.43 The rationale in Grutter that creating diversity in
the classroom promotes "cross-racial understanding" is an
Desegregation. Libemting Hearts and Minds, 2 IOWA J. GENDER, RACE & JUSTICE 316, 325-
25 (1999) (exploring the role of curriculum in perpetuating a system of racial hierarchy).
39. RALPH ELLISON, THE INVISIBLE MAN (1952).
40. Roger M. Smith, Black and White After Brown: Constructions of Race in
Modem Supreme Court Decisions, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 709, 715 (2003).
41. Wendy Brown Scott, The Mseducation of White America, 9 WIDENER L. SYMP. J.
73 (2002).
42. 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
43. See Brown, supra note 2, at 2093-95. Justice Douglas notes the psychological
harm done to whites by "encouraging the growth of the fiction of a superior race." Defunis,
416 U.S. at 336 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
44. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2339-40 (2003).
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acknowledgment of the need for what I call intellectual, or
"transformative[,] desegregation.' 5
Gmtter has not resolved the question of how to define and
manage race relations in America. Professors Brown, Ware, and White
stress that the larger questions of racial equality and economic security
for Americans of color remain. All of the panelists made it clear that,
for better or worse, race still matters. I hope that during the next
twenty-five years all Americans will learn more about the culture,
thought, and history of blacks and other people of color, and not rely
solely on their own experience as the measure of life for others. We
should interpret Justice O'Connor's aspirational statement as a call to
finally end the replication of racial injustice. Several things need
attention, especially the improvement of public K-12 education. The
Court should relax the limitations placed on voluntary desegregation
plans in Missouri v Jenkins.46  School systems should address the
educational decline of black men. 7 In sum, we should value diversity
outside the higher education context and encourage government to
continue efforts to remedy the remaining effects of past discrimination.
45. In the context of school desegregation litigation, I use the idea of transformative
desegregation to justify calling curriculum vestiges of dejure segregation. Scott, supm note
38, at 319-20. Transformative desegregation requires that we unlearn the white racial
superiority/black racial inferiority model. Id at 321.
46. 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
47. See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2362 n.l 1 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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